Definition

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  • Connector.

    Inverse condemnation is defined as "a cause of action against a government agency to recover the value of property taken by the agency, though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been completed."

    BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979). Cited in: Shimazaki, Junji. “Land Use Takings and the Problem of Ripeness in the United States Supreme Court Cases.” BYU J. Pub. L. 1 (1986): 375.

  • Connector.

    Inverse condemnation is defined as “a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.”

    United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980). Cited in: Foncello, Martin J. “Adverse Possession and Takings Seldom Compensation for Chance Happenings.” Seton Hall L. Rev. 35 (2004): 667.

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    Inverse condemnation is defined as “[a]n action brought by a property owner for compensationfrom a governmental entity that has taken the owner’s property without bringing formal condemnation pro-ceedings.”

    BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (9th ed. 2009). Cited in: Kinman, Tara. “Striking a Balance in the Valuation of Temporary Takings: Examining the Award of Lost Profits in Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque.” NML Rev. 40 (2010): 337.

  • Connector.

    The full definition reads, “[t]he determination and declaration that certain property (esp.land) is assigned to public use, subject to reasonable compensation; the exercise of eminent domain by a governmental entity.”

    Havran, T. D. “Eminent Domain and the Police Power.” Notre Dame Law. 5 (1929): 380.

The two situations where the government may take property include: (1) the physical appropriations of property for public use; and (2) restrictions on uses of property which are so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation.Foncello, Martin J. "Adverse Possession and Takings Seldom Compensate for Chance Happenings." Seton Hall Law Review 35.2 (2011): 6.